Who Defends the Brazilian People in the Management of Public Debt?
Auditing, monetary reform, accountability and political economy: why the management of Brazilian debt must serve the interests of the population.
Fernando Fagundes Ferreira ·
A monetary reform without an audit may reduce the cost of public debt without clarifying how it was formed. An audit without monetary reform may identify irregularities and distortions without changing the mechanisms that reproduce indebtedness. Without accountability, both may remain distant from effective democratic oversight. Defending the interests of the Brazilian population requires these three dimensions to be linked to a fourth condition: the ongoing evaluation of their economic and social results.
Discussion of Brazilian public debt remains subject to a persistent asymmetry. The State’s primary expenditures, particularly those devoted to maintaining public services, social policies, and investment, face constant demands for restraint, while the financial cost of indebtedness is often presented as an inevitable consequence of technical decisions, market expectations, and contractual commitments. This distinction shapes a significant part of the fiscal debate, but leaves insufficiently examined the institutional choices that determine the remuneration of financial capital and their effects on the distribution of public resources.
Official figures make this discussion unavoidable. According to the Central Bank, in the twelve months ending in August 2026, nominal interest payments by the consolidated public sector totaled R$ 1.182 trillion, equivalent to 8.86% of Gross Domestic Product. Over the same period, the accumulated primary deficit was R$ 82.1 billion, or 0.62% of GDP. Although these indicators are distinct in accounting terms, their magnitude demonstrates that analysis of public accounts cannot be confined to primary expenditures.
It is in this context that the article I Accuse: a proposal to eliminate absurdly high interest rates, published in September 2026 by economist André Lara Resende, reignited a familiar controversy. A member of the team responsible for formulating the Real Plan, Lara Resende questions the rationale for maintaining high interest rates, attributing a decisive share of the fiscal imbalance that monetary policy itself seeks to combat to that policy.
His proposal combines a planned reduction in the Selic rate, a reorganization of fiscal and monetary coordination, and the creation of a National Fiscal and Monetary Council. The argument shifts attention from the exclusive control of primary spending to the cost of financing the State, challenging a central premise of dominant interpretations of Brazilian fiscal adjustment.
The article’s reception, however, offers an opportunity that goes beyond the debate over Lara Resende’s individual proposal. For decades, Maria Lucia Fattorelli and the Citizens’ Debt Audit have questioned the mechanisms of indebtedness, the cost of interest, the remuneration of financial institutions, and the inadequate public oversight of these operations.
The precedence of this questioning can be verified. The Citizens’ Debt Audit maintains campaigns, studies, and legislative initiatives related to limiting interest rates and investigating public debt. These include PLP 104/2022, submitted to the Chamber of Deputies at the initiative of the Participatory Legislation Committee, which addresses limits on interest in financial contracts and operations. The legislative proposal is not equivalent to a comprehensive reform of monetary policy, but it demonstrates the existence of institutional initiatives that predate the current debate.
Nor does convergence between the two economists need to be presumed. In a statement released on November 3, Fattorelli expressly recognized the importance of Lara Resende’s proposal, recalling that the Citizens’ Debt Audit has questioned the interest-rate policy practiced in Brazil for decades.
The encounter between these perspectives makes it possible to pose a question more relevant than the pursuit of intellectual prominence: why are monetary reforms, debt audits, and institutional accountability still discussed as separate agendas, despite addressing interdependent dimensions of the same problem?
The debt that takes shape and the debt that reproduces itself
Auditing public debt and reforming monetary policy answer different but complementary questions. The first examines how financial obligations were formed, their legality and composition, the procedures for contracting and issuing securities, associated costs, and the quality of institutional controls. The second investigates the mechanisms that determine the evolution of indebtedness, including interest, indexation, refinancing, inflation, economic growth, and financing conditions.
A debt that was duly incurred may become excessively burdensome as a result of a particular monetary policy. Likewise, a lower-interest-rate policy does not eliminate any irregularities in the formation of financial obligations. This difference is precisely what demonstrates the inadequacy of isolated solutions.
The large share of securities remunerated at rates linked to the Selic establishes a direct relationship between monetary decisions and portions of the federal debt’s cost. The concrete effect depends on the composition of the securities, their maturity dates, and market conditions. Other components of the debt respond to inflation, fixed rates, or exchange-rate fluctuations.
A reduction in the Selic may ease the cost of certain liabilities, but it is not a risk-free operation. A trajectory incompatible with inflationary and financial conditions may put pressure on the exchange rate, raise inflation expectations, make new issues more expensive, and undermine the very gains being sought. These risks must be demonstrated, quantified, and weighed against the costs of maintaining high interest rates.
An audit, in turn, should not begin with the predetermined conclusion that the debt is illegal or illegitimate. Its function is to produce evidence capable of confirming the regularity of operations, identifying failures, assessing costs, and supporting any corrective measures.
Combining the two agendas makes it possible to investigate both the origin of financial obligations and the mechanisms responsible for reproducing them.
Accountability: who decides, who oversees, and who answers?
Public debt is managed by institutions with specific areas of responsibility. The National Treasury manages federal debt, the Central Bank implements monetary policy, Congress establishes rules and exercises oversight functions, while the Federal Court of Accounts participates in the external oversight of public administration.
The existence of these structures, however, does not settle the discussion of accountability. Publishing indicators, releasing minutes, or presenting technical reports is an important dimension of transparency, but does not replace public evaluation of the basis, results, and consequences of economic decisions.
Articles 70 and 71 of the Brazilian Constitution establish mechanisms for accounting, financial, budgetary, operational, and asset oversight, incorporating the criteria of legality, legitimacy, and economy. This is a concrete institutional basis for examining the management of public resources, subject to the powers and safeguards of each body.
A monetary policy subject to accountability must provide verifiable justifications for its decisions, make its assumptions explicit, acknowledge margins of uncertainty, and allow subsequent evaluations of performance. The same principle should guide debt management, including the cost of issuances, refinancing strategies, risk management, and the distributive effects of the choices made.
The Central Bank’s operational independence does not mean an absence of public responsibility. Its institutional purpose must be preserved, but decision-making autonomy coexists with obligations of transparency, accountability, and compliance with the objectives established by law. Accountability does not, in itself, authorize punishing officials for technical disagreements or adverse economic outcomes. It requires legal standards, the identification of duties, and procedures capable of distinguishing error, legitimate risk, negligence, and irregularity.
The central question is no longer merely who has the formal authority to decide. It also concerns the quality of the decision, oversight of its implementation, and the possibility of institutional correction.
Political economy: the distribution of benefits and costs
Remuneration on public debt has distributive effects that do not disappear simply because it results from legal contracts or institutionally regular monetary decisions. High interest rates may increase financial returns, influence the price of credit, affect investment decisions, and change the State’s financing conditions.
Identifying the beneficiaries nevertheless requires rigor. Holders of public securities do not constitute a socially homogeneous category. Financial institutions, investment funds, pension entities, foreign investors, and individuals participate in this market through different mechanisms. The ultimate distribution of returns also depends on ownership structures, intermediation, and taxation.
Likewise, it is not technically correct to equate all debt amortization with a definitive expense that could automatically be redirected to social policies. A significant share of maturing debt is refinanced through new issuances. Any assessment of effective fiscal space must distinguish interest, principal, financial operations, and budgetary rules.
These distinctions do not weaken the investigation into the distribution of the costs and benefits of indebtedness. On the contrary, they prevent a structural issue from being reduced to impressive figures that are not compatible from an accounting perspective.
The debate must also examine how different interests participate in the formulation of economic policies. The influence of financial actors can be studied through public consultations, institutional meetings, technical submissions, lobbying activities, and records of decisions. The existence of such participation does not prove regulatory capture. To substantiate that hypothesis, it would be necessary to demonstrate concrete mechanisms of undue influence, favoritism, or compromise of the public interest.
The legitimate question remains: which interests are taken into account in economic decisions, with what transparency, and through what opportunities for participation and challenge?
Defending the Brazilian people as the purpose of economic policy
The debate over public debt finds its most important meaning in the relationship between the State’s financial decisions and the living conditions of the population.
Protecting the public interest is not the same as making an automatic choice between low interest rates and monetary stability, or between fiscal discipline and the expansion of social services. High inflation undermines wages and incomes, especially for groups with less capacity for financial protection. Persistently high interest rates, on the other hand, can restrict credit, discourage investment, increase fiscal costs, and affect economic activity.
Defending the Brazilian people requires assessing these effects simultaneously, rather than turning particular economic instruments into untouchable political ends.
A fiscal or monetary policy must also be examined in terms of its effects on employment, income, the cost of living, investment capacity, and the financing of social rights. This assessment must consider time horizons, indirect consequences, and differences between social groups. Measures apparently favorable in the short term may produce later costs; policies presented as essential to stability may impose distributive sacrifices that need to be made explicit and justified.
This is where auditing, monetary reform, and accountability converge with a broader democratic requirement: the population cannot appear merely as the recipient of the costs of economic decisions, without adequate tools to learn, understand, and question their foundations.
Defending the public interest does not require that every economic decision be put to a referendum or that technical management be replaced by constant political disputes. It requires institutions capable of combining specialized knowledge, constitutional responsibility, transparency, oversight, and democratic participation.
In this sense, oversight of public debt must ensure not only the regularity of transactions, but also that their effects are intelligible to society.
An institutional reform agenda
André Lara Resende’s contribution brings the relationship between interest rates and fiscal imbalances back into discussion, challenging the idea that the stability of public finances depends primarily on containing primary expenditure. Maria Lucia Fattorelli’s work adds the need to examine the mechanisms through which debt is formed and remunerated, its oversight, and the allocation of financial resources.
The two approaches have significant theoretical, institutional, and operational differences. They do not warrant the conclusion that there is technical consensus on a specific Selic trajectory, on legal interest-rate limits, or on the consequences of an audit. Nor should they be treated as mutually exclusive alternatives.
Brazil’s challenge is to build an agenda capable of bringing together an independent assessment of public debt, a well-founded discussion of monetary policy, and improvements to accountability mechanisms. This agenda must include analysis of distributive effects and establish verifiable criteria for assessing its contribution to the public interest.
Recognition of economic complexity cannot serve as a justification for shielding financial decisions from democratic scrutiny. The existence of technical risks likewise does not justify ignoring the social costs of monetary policy or treating the structure of debt as immune to institutional examination.
Brazil has instruments for oversight, statistical production, and public control. The question is to what extent these instruments are used in an integrated way to assess decisions that commit resources, distribute returns, and condition future investment possibilities.
Public debt is a legitimate instrument of state financing. Its management, however, cannot be considered an exclusive domain of monetary authorities, financial managers, or creditors. Decisions that determine its cost and evolution belong to the sphere of public responsibilities and must answer to criteria of legality, economy, transparency, and the collective interest.
Defending the Brazilian people presupposes an economic policy whose results can be known, evaluated, and democratically questioned. Debt sustainability, monetary stability, and fiscal balance are important dimensions of this responsibility, but they do not exhaust its purposes.
The decisive question is not only how much the Brazilian State owes or how much it pays in interest. It is who governs this debt, under what oversight, with what consequences, and for whose benefit.
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Sources and references
- André Lara Resende. I Accuse: A Proposal to Eliminate Absurdly High Interest Rates. September 2026.
- Auditoria Cidadã da Dívida. Statement by Maria Lucia Fattorelli on Lara Resende’s proposal. November 2026.
- Chamber of Deputies. Complementary Bill 104/2022.
- Central Bank of Brazil. Fiscal Statistics. August 2026 data.
- National Treasury. Monthly Federal Public Debt Report. September 2026.
- Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil, Articles 70 and 71.