Influence on Trial: The Double Standard of American Geopolitics
The confrontation between the American and Chinese embassies in Brazil exposes the contradictions of cultural diplomacy, the limits of freedom of movement and the use of national security in the dispute over what constitutes legitimate foreign influence.
Fernando Fagundes Ferreira ·
The dispute begins at the embassies
A controversy over institutions dedicated to teaching the Chinese language turned into a demonstration of two geopolitical communication strategies. On October 23, 2026, United States Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth announced that the Pentagon had classified Confucius Institutes as a threat to American national security. In a video posted on social media, he accused organizations linked to China of reappearing under new names at American universities to exert ideological influence and improperly obtain intellectual property.
Hegseth stated that 80 organizations spread across 30 universities had been identified and dismantled through Department of Defense actions. However, in the material examined, the statement was not accompanied by documentation on each organization that would allow the public to verify its responsibility for the alleged practices.
The United States Embassy in Brazil amplified the classification on its official account on the X platform, bringing the controversy into the Brazilian public sphere. The message reproduced the national security framing adopted by Washington, presenting Confucius Institutes as a matter of strategic concern.
The response from the Chinese Embassy in Brazil shifted the dispute onto entirely different ground. In a post reproducing the American statement, the Chinese diplomatic mission addressed Brazilians directly, reminding them that they do not need a visa to visit China and inviting them to learn a little Mandarin, get to know the country, and talk to its people.
The contrast reveals a significant difference in communication strategy. While the American diplomatic mission linked Chinese cultural institutions to national security, its Chinese counterpart responded with an invitation to experience a foreign society firsthand, rejecting the threat framing as the starting point for its communication.
The response neither proves that the American accusations are unfounded nor eliminates legitimate concerns about university autonomy. It does demonstrate, however, that the struggle for international influence also involves the ability to establish the terms in which a reality will be presented to the public.
In this episode, China did not merely seek to defend the legitimacy of its institutes. The embassy's message offered Brazilians an alternative way of gaining knowledge that shifted the controversy from government accusations to contact between people.
The episode raises a broader question: why are certain international initiatives described as cultural diplomacy, while others come to be treated as threats to national security, and what evidence justifies that distinction?
Freedom of movement in the confrontation between rhetoric and reality
The reference to visas introduces a particularly significant dimension for examining the relationship between international openness, freedom of movement, and democratic rhetoric.
Since June 1, 2025, Brazilian citizens holding ordinary passports have been able to visit China without a visa for stays of up to 30 days, for tourism, business, exchanges, and other authorized purposes. The policy was subsequently extended through December 31, 2026.
On May 11, 2026, Brazil also began exempting Chinese citizens from visa requirements for certain visits of up to 30 days, establishing reciprocity with the policy initially adopted by Beijing.
The contrast with the United States is concrete. Brazilians wishing to visit American territory for tourism or business generally remain subject to obtaining a visa in advance through a consular process and paying a basic application fee of US$185 for the B1/B2 category, with no guarantee of approval.
Bilateral reciprocity has another consequence: on April 10, 2025, Brazil resumed requiring visas for American visitors after a period of unilateral exemption.
These differences do not establish the democratic character of each political regime. A visa-exemption policy is no substitute for competitive elections, civil liberties, judicial independence, or guarantees of political participation. Likewise, a visa requirement does not, in itself, indicate an absence of democracy.
However, international movement constitutes a concrete dimension of individual freedom and of the relationship between states and societies. The conditions for getting to know another country, establishing personal contacts, and accessing educational or economic opportunities deserve examination without allowing rhetoric about openness to replace observation of the practices actually adopted.
The comparison is especially relevant because the Chinese diplomatic mission itself introduced this element into the diplomatic controversy. By inviting Brazilians to visit the country without a visa, Beijing presented an objective condition of access to its territory that contrasts with American consular requirements.
This is not a matter of automatically attributing democratic virtues to China or disregarding the justifications the United States offers for its immigration policy. The issue is recognizing that the political language of freedom, openness, and security must be tested against its concrete manifestations.
A narrative's legitimacy does not stem simply from the political regime or international standing of whoever articulates it.
Confucius Institutes and the struggle over academic autonomy
Established beginning in 2004, Confucius Institutes constitute an international cooperation network focused on teaching Mandarin and promoting Chinese culture, often through partnerships with foreign universities.
In Brazil, São Paulo State University established a partnership with Hubei University in 2008 to develop activities of this kind.
The presence of institutions linked to the Chinese government in university settings raises legitimate questions about funding, contractual transparency, content selection, academic freedom, and possible interference in teaching and research activities.
The existence of these risks, however, does not justify turning every institution in the network into an espionage organization.
In a report published in 2019, the Government Accountability Office (GAO), the auditing body of the U.S. Congress, examined 90 agreements related to Confucius Institutes and identified opportunities to improve institutional transparency. At the ten universities studied in depth, administrators stated that they retained academic control over activities, although researchers and other interlocutors expressed concerns about the possibility of undue influence.
In 2023, another GAO report recorded a decline from approximately one hundred institutes at American universities in 2019 to fewer than five. Among the factors mentioned by institutions that ended partnerships were external pressure and the risk of losing federal funding.
The decline demonstrates that legal, budgetary, and administrative decisions can have significant effects on international academic cooperation. It does not, in itself, demonstrate that all the institutions that closed had committed the alleged irregularities.
It is precisely in this distinction between risk, suspicion, evidence, and responsibility that the controversy becomes relevant to an analysis of the geopolitics of lawfare.
The American infrastructure of cultural diplomacy
The United States also maintains an extensive international network dedicated to promoting its language, cultural values, educational institutions, and diplomatic interests.
American Spaces are a documented example of this activity. According to the U.S. Department of State itself, these facilities are operated or supported by the United States government to conduct public diplomacy activities aligned with its foreign policy objectives.
The network includes cultural centers, information spaces, English-language teaching programs, guidance on studying at American universities, and outreach activities aimed at foreign audiences. Its work may take place in government facilities or through partnerships with local institutions.
The Department of State explicitly acknowledges the strategic dimension of these initiatives. Cultural promotion thus appears not as an accidental consequence of its international presence but as a declared component of American foreign policy.
In Brazil, Casa Thomas Jefferson represents a historical manifestation of this model of cultural outreach. Founded in Brasília in 1963, the institution conducts English-language teaching and educational cooperation activities with recognition from, and partnerships with, the American diplomatic mission.
Its own institutional history records the United States Embassy's participation in the discussions that preceded its creation. This does not mean, however, that Casa Thomas Jefferson is administratively subordinate to the embassy. It is a private Brazilian organization with its own legal personality and autonomy.
The distinction is essential. A cultural connection or cooperation with a foreign government does not prove unlawful interference, just as formal autonomy does not obviate the need to examine any concrete irregularities.
The same criteria must be applied to the Alliance Française, the Goethe-Institut, the Instituto Cervantes, the British Council, and cultural cooperation organizations of any other nationality.
The central point is not to establish an artificial equivalence between institutions with different structures, but to recognize that the international projection of culture, education, and political values is a practice shared by multiple states.
The sponsor's nationality should not replace an assessment of the actual nature of its activities.
Economic influence and the role of Amchams
The international architecture of influence extends beyond the educational and cultural spheres. Transnational business organizations also participate in building political, economic, and regulatory relations between countries.
American chambers of commerce, known as Amchams, offer an example of this type of activity.
Founded in 1919, Amcham Brasil is a private association bringing together companies of different origins and economic sectors. The organization reports having approximately 3,500 member companies whose activities represent, according to its own indicators, about one-third of Brazil's gross domestic product.
Its activities include business networking, trade promotion, producing studies, debates on public policy, and dialogue with authorities.
This activity is not equivalent to the operation of Confucius Institutes. The representation of business interests has a purpose, institutional nature, and mechanisms of operation distinct from those of a university cultural center.
There is, however, a common issue: both types of activity can contribute to shaping political, economic, and cultural environments favorable to particular international interests.
This does not automatically make Amchams instruments subordinate to the United States government, nor does it mean that their activities constitute foreign interference. The organized advocacy of private interests is part of the functioning of democratic societies and is subject to applicable rules on transparency, representation, and public integrity.
The relevant aspect for this analysis is the need for consistent oversight criteria. If the international origin of funding, institutional ties, and the possibility of influencing national decisions justify scrutiny at universities, similar questions can also be examined, with due regard for their differences, in the relationship between business organizations and public authorities.
Investigation must focus on behaviors, mechanisms of influence, and their consequences, not on presumptions derived from nationality.
The securitization of influence and the limits of lawfare
Classifying an international activity as a threat to national security produces consequences beyond its discursive dimension. It can alter academic relations, make funding conditional, restrict partnerships, and change public perceptions of particular institutions.
This process relates to the concept of securitization, through which an issue comes to be presented as a threat requiring special protective or control measures.
Securitization does not automatically constitute lawfare. States have legitimate responsibilities to protect strategic information, prevent espionage, and oversee international relationships capable of compromising public interests.
The hypothesis that legal instruments are being weaponized requires additional demonstration. It is necessary to examine the proportionality of the measures, their evidentiary foundations, the procedures used, the opportunities to challenge them, and any selective application of legal rules or administrative restrictions.
In the American case, documentation on the decline of Confucius Institutes demonstrates the importance of federal funding mechanisms and institutional decisions in ending partnerships. Concluding that such mechanisms were used abusively would require a specific investigation.
The geopolitics of lawfare emerges as a field of inquiry precisely because legal, regulatory, and administrative instruments can play a part in international power struggles. Whether their use is legitimate or abusive depends on verifiable circumstances, not ideological assumptions.
Public Intelligibility Review™: what can the public actually understand?
Applying Public Intelligibility Review™ (PIR™) to the controversy between the embassies makes it possible to identify a problem running through the different dimensions examined: the possible gap between political classifications disseminated publicly and the evidence that allows them to be assessed.
First dimension: identification of the facts. The American secretary announced the classification of Confucius Institutes as a threat to national security. The United States diplomatic mission publicized this position in Brazil, and the Chinese Embassy responded with an invitation to get to know the country. These events can be distinguished from the interpretations attributed to each statement.
Second dimension: quality of the evidence. Allegations of espionage, intellectual property theft, and political interference require specific substantiation. An institution's association with a particular government is no substitute for demonstrating unlawful conduct.
Third dimension: consistency of criteria. The international activities of cultural, academic, and business organizations must be examined according to standards appropriate to each activity but independent of the nationality of those promoting them.
Fourth dimension: intelligibility of political language. Expressions such as national security, propaganda, foreign interference, and cultural diplomacy must be accompanied by operational definitions and evidence that make their use understandable.
Fifth dimension: confrontation between rhetoric and practice. Comparing visa policies demonstrates how declarations of international openness can be analyzed in light of the conditions actually offered to citizens. This analysis does not replace broader institutional assessments of democracy and fundamental rights.
PIR™ does not seek to establish in advance the legitimacy or culpability of the institutions involved. Its aim is to verify whether the public has sufficient information to distinguish demonstrated events, official accusations, political interpretations, and analytical hypotheses.
Public intelligibility depends on this separation. Without it, strategic classifications can circulate as self-evident truths, while the absence of oversight can be improperly presented as a guarantee of legitimacy.
The struggle for the power to define reality
The controversy between the American and Chinese embassies demonstrates that contemporary international relations do not unfold solely through competition for markets, technological resources, and military capability. They also involve producing interpretations of which initiatives deserve trust, which pose risks, and which states have the authority to establish these distinctions.
The contrast between the American accusation and the Chinese invitation reveals distinct communication strategies, but it does not justify turning either into definitive proof of the legitimacy of its respective government.
The essential issue remains the need for public, verifiable criteria to assess concrete institutional behaviors.
Cultural influence is not espionage by definition. Advocacy of business interests does not automatically constitute illegitimate interference. Protecting national security, in turn, does not dispense with justification, proportionality, and oversight mechanisms.
A rules-based international order requires that the principles invoked be applied consistently, including to organizations linked to the powers making the accusations.
The decisive struggle concerns not only who exercises influence over other societies, but who has the power to define which influences will be considered legitimate and which may be turned into threats. The quality of that definition depends less on the authority of the accuser than on the possibility of subjecting their claims to public scrutiny of the evidence.