Master and Ueno: The Dynamic Duo on the Couch of Regulatory Narco-Statization
From Brazil to Paraguay, two banking scandals expose parallels between regulatory authorizations, capital flows, revolving doors, political influence and public assets. Ueno's international connections add a new dimension to the debate on financial supervision.
Fernando Fagundes Ferreira ·
From Brazil to Paraguay, two banking scandals reveal parallels involving regulatory approvals, the movement of capital, revolving doors, political influence, and public assets. Ueno’s international connections add a new dimension to the debate over financial supervision.
Two banks, two countries, and trajectories with enough similarities to spark a debate about financial regulation mechanisms in Latin America.
In Brazil, Banco Master, controlled by Daniel Vorcaro, was ordered into liquidation in November 2025, after a period of rapid expansion, financial transactions questioned by authorities, and exposure of public institutions to the risks of its business.
In Paraguay, Ueno Bank experienced similarly substantial growth before entering a resolution process in November 2026, triggering a crisis that reached the presidency of the Republic and the monetary authority itself.
The episodes share more than banking difficulties. Their trajectories involve regulatory approvals, relations with political power, the movement of executives between public and private institutions, transactions among related companies, and financial decisions whose consequences went beyond shareholders’ interests.
This convergence offers a field of observation for the analytical tool that Lawfare4All calls regulatory narco-statization.
The term makes it possible to examine processes through which economic interests associated with potentially illicit financial circuits can penetrate, influence, or instrumentalize public regulatory structures. Its scope includes mechanisms for laundering capital derived from different criminal activities, without restricting the analysis to drug trafficking.
The aim is to observe how relations among regulators, regulated entities, and political actors can affect institutional independence, oversight, and the protection of public assets.
Journalistic interest does not begin when banks collapse. It begins much earlier, with the administrative decisions that authorize their transformation, oversee their expansion, and establish the limits of their operations.
Before Master, Banco Máxima
Banco Master’s trajectory under Daniel Vorcaro’s control began with a fundamental decision by the Central Bank of Brazil.
In February 2019, the monetary authority rejected the proposal to transfer control of the former Banco Máxima to Vorcaro’s group.
The decision involved questions about the buyers’ financial capacity and proof of the origin of the funds intended for the transaction.
According to a report by Folha de S.Paulo, the review had identified indications of possible financial circularization, a situation in which resources presented as asset capacity may have moved among related companies.
On October 14, 2019, eight months later, the Central Bank’s board of directors approved the transfer of control.
The authorization came during Roberto Campos Neto’s presidency, following the submission of a new proposal and additional documentation considered sufficient to overcome the previous restrictions.
Both decisions were unanimous.
The sequence is an essential point in Master’s regulatory trajectory. Between rejection and approval, the Central Bank came to consider requirements that had initially blocked the transfer as having been met.
What elements allowed this change in understanding? How were the new asset guarantees assessed? How did the monetary authority monitor the risks associated with the institution in subsequent years?
These questions take on importance in light of the bank’s expansion and the difficulties that culminated in its liquidation in 2025.
The Central Bank did not legally create Master, since the institution already existed under the name Banco Máxima. However, it authorized the corporate transfer that enabled its reorganization and subsequent consolidation under Vorcaro’s control.
The 2019 authorization thus represents a milestone for understanding the relationship between the bank and Brazil’s regulatory system.
In Paraguay, the path between market and state
The transformation of Financeira Ueno into a bank presents another relevant institutional trajectory.
Carlos Carvallo served in the leadership of the Paraguayan Central Bank, became president of Financeira Ueno, and returned to the monetary authority in September 2023, this time as its president.
In November of that year, the Central Bank authorized the finance company’s transformation into a bank.
Carvallo’s path illustrates a phenomenon known internationally as the revolving door: the movement of professionals between regulated institutions and the bodies responsible for supervising them.
This mobility can involve technical expertise, professional networks, access to strategic information, and relationships built over successive institutional positions.
In Paraguay’s case, the public interest in transparency around this process is evident. The head of a financial institution took command of the authority responsible for regulating the sector to which the company belonged.
The Paraguayan Central Bank maintained that Carvallo abstained from decisions related to Ueno, a mechanism intended to preserve the independence of deliberations.
The discussion, however, goes beyond an individual’s participation in a vote. It involves governance structures, mechanisms for preventing conflicts of interest, and the degree of autonomy in regulatory decisions.
The institution’s trajectory was also associated with the political sphere.
Santiago Peña, president of Paraguay during Ueno’s expansion, had previous business ties to the bank’s controlling economic group.
Taken together, these relationships offer a relevant field for examining the proximity between financial companies, monetary authorities, and structures of political power.
Revolving doors do not swing in only one direction
The comparison between Master and Ueno reveals different forms of movement between state and market.
In Paraguay, Carvallo’s trajectory traversed practically the entire circuit: Central Bank, financial institution, and return to the head of the Central Bank.
In Brazil, the relationship between regulators and regulated entities also involves professionals who, after serving in public functions, go on to work as consultants, lawyers, or representatives of financial-sector interests.
In the case related to Banco Máxima, Isaac Sidney, a former Central Bank director and later president of the Brazilian Federation of Banks (Febraban), provided legal and regulatory advice connected to the institution.
Sidney said he had ended his involvement before the authorization granted in October 2019 and denied interfering in the decision.
The trajectory illustrates the movement of specialized knowledge and professional relationships among different positions in the financial system.
This movement also occurs in the opposite direction, when private-sector executives and specialists take on public oversight roles.
The institutional problem arises when proximity between these spheres compromises the independence of decisions, creates inequalities in access, or allows private interests to override the collective interest.
In Master’s case, investigations into possible favors involving Central Bank employees added another dimension to the discussion: influence over officials who remain in the exercise of their public duties.
The revolving door and the possible co-opting of public servants are distinct phenomena, but both form part of the debate about institutional permeability.
The comparison does not depend on identical personal trajectories. Its subject is understanding how relations between market and state can take shape along different paths and produce similar vulnerabilities in oversight mechanisms.
Expansion and regulatory warnings
Authorization to operate represents only the beginning of the relationship between a financial institution and its regulator.
In Brazil, Banco Master grew through fundraising strategies that included high-yield bank deposit certificates, alongside transactions involving complex-to-value assets and credit portfolios later questioned by authorities.
During Campos Neto’s tenure, the Central Bank received information about risks related to the group and adopted monitoring measures.
In 2023, according to statements Gabriel Galípolo later made to the Senate, Campos Neto ordered a detailed analysis of the bank’s balance sheet and portfolio.
In November 2024, corrective requirements related to governance and liquidity were formalized.
The chronology shows that Master’s supervision was already on the regulatory agenda before Galípolo’s tenure.
The debate therefore shifts to the timeliness and effectiveness of the measures adopted, taking into account the evolution of risks and the legal instruments available.
In November 2025, under Galípolo’s presidency, the Central Bank ordered the extrajudicial liquidation of institutions in the conglomerate, basing its decision on a severe liquidity crisis, financial and economic impairment, and significant violations of banking rules.
In Paraguay, documentation on Ueno makes it possible to observe more directly certain transactions that drew supervisors’ attention.
A technical report by the Superintendency of Banks, dated June 8, 2026, and later disclosed by the newspaper ABC Color, identified credit operations involving three companies related to Grupo Vázquez: Mowi SA, Grupo Hendy SA, and Grupo M SA.
Between September 2025 and May 2026, these companies received approximately US$146 million in loan disbursements and credit operations granted by Ueno.
The resources moved amounted to about 35% of the institution’s effective equity, using the equity indicators presented in the report as a reference.
An examination of outstanding balances in April 2026 found approximately US$41.5 million in excess of the prudential limit permitted for transactions with related companies, considering these three companies.
The documentation also pointed to loans granted without real collateral, preferential terms, and insufficient analysis of repayment capacity.
Some of the funds were later transferred to other companies related to the conglomerate, including Itti, Redipro, and Redisa, to cover negative balances and operating expenses.
The movement of funds among related companies adds an important dimension to the debate about the effectiveness of internal controls and banking supervision mechanisms.
The June report and a subsequent memorandum in July show that the monetary authority identified and documented problems related to the transactions.
The institutional question lies in the response to these warnings and the monitoring of the measures required of the institution.
In November 2026, the Paraguayan Central Bank began Ueno’s resolution process after finding a capital shortfall that reduced its solvency ratio to less than half the required minimum.
The interval between the transactions examined, the inspection records, and the bank resolution is one of the central elements of the comparison.
Ueno and Visión: the engineering of prudential decisions
An earlier episode in Paraguay’s expansion deserves particular attention.
In 2024, the Central Bank authorized Ueno’s acquisition of Visión Banco.
The transaction involved special measures for the accounting treatment of impaired loans from the acquired institution.
According to information published by the Paraguayan press, the regulator authorized the deferral of approximately US$300 million in problem loans, for a period that could extend to 20 years.
The mechanism allowed the recognition of certain losses or provisions to be spread over time, under the conditions set out in the authorization.
The institution’s leaders defended the measure as a prudential flexibility tool intended to enable the bank’s reorganization.
Its relevance to the comparison lies in the relationship among regulatory decisions, asset valuation, and the presentation of institutions’ financial soundness.
In Brazil, the transfer of control of the former Máxima involved questions about financial capacity and the origin of funds. Later, Master’s supervision began examining the quality of assets and credit operations.
In Paraguay, the acquisition of Visión introduced debate about exceptional accounting treatment, recognition of losses, and prudential conditions applied to an expanding institution.
These are different mechanisms, embedded in different regulatory contexts. Bringing them together makes it possible to examine how technical decisions can influence banks’ trajectories and perceptions of their financial capacity.
Ueno’s subsequent crisis raises further questions about the effectiveness of the requirements and conditions imposed during the acquisition.
It is in this interval between authorization, expansion, and deterioration in capital that the discussion of regulatory supervision gains greater depth.
Mar-a-Lago: when financial expansion meets international political networking
The movement of capital among related companies was not the only significant development during Ueno’s expansion.
On February 10, 2026, the bank was among the main sponsors of the Hispanic Prosperity Gala, held at the Mar-a-Lago club in Florida, owned by Donald Trump.
Organized by Latino Wall Street, the event brought together businesspeople, political operatives, and figures linked to conservative movements in Latin America and the United States.
Ueno was listed among the six sponsors in the Diamond category, whose announced price was US$100,000.
The bank’s presence was reported by the Paraguayan newspaper ABC Color and later confirmed by posts from the event’s organizing group, examined by Argentina’s Chequeado.
Among the participants was Brazilian lawmaker Eduardo Bolsonaro, who presented a tribute to Argentine strategist Fernando Cerimedo.
Cerimedo gained international prominence for his work on political campaigns and for spreading unfounded allegations of fraud in Brazil’s 2022 elections.
The event also brought together members of political networks associated with Trumpism and Latin American conservatism.
Ueno’s participation in this setting adds a transnational dimension to the trajectory of a bank whose expansion had already prompted questions about transactions with related companies and the management of public funds.
The chronology is especially relevant.
In September 2025, the credit operations later examined by Paraguayan supervisors began. In February 2026, Ueno was among the prominent sponsors of an international political ceremony. In June, a supervision report detailed transactions that exceeded prudential limits applicable to related companies. In November, the institution entered a resolution process.
Sponsorship and credit operations belong to different spheres of banking activity, but their simultaneity raises questions about business priorities, governance mechanisms, and the relationship between political expansion and financial supervision.
The possibility that relationships established at events of this kind may expand financial institutions’ presence in international networks of influence also merits attention.
What matters is not only the announced sponsorship amount, but the institutional context in which the participation took place and the political and business ties the event made visible.
Analysis of this episode adds a question to those already raised by the financial operations: how are a bank’s international profile, its business interests, and the supervision requirements to which it remains subject connected?
Public assets in the equation
Another point of convergence between Master and Ueno is the presence of public institutions in transactions capable of generating significant financial risks.
In Brazil, relations between Master and Banco de Brasília (BRB), controlled by the government of the Federal District, became central to investigations related to the trading of credit portfolios and other financial operations.
BRB’s attempted acquisition of Master expanded the political dimension of the episode, although it was rejected by the Central Bank.
In Paraguay, Ueno held substantial deposits from state institutions, including funds related to the Instituto de Previsión Social, which is responsible for social security benefits.
During the crisis, the volume of public deposits associated with the bank was estimated at approximately US$850 million.
The exposure of these funds raised questions about investment criteria, risk concentration, and mechanisms intended to protect beneficiaries.
The two situations involve different financial structures, but converge in the discussion about the relationship between private decisions and collective assets.
A bank’s health ceases to be an exclusive concern of its shareholders when its operations involve funds managed on behalf of society.
The capacity to oversee and prevent risks then also involves the governance of public institutions that maintain relations with the financial system.
Circles of influence beyond the banks
The trajectories of Master and Ueno also reveal relationships that extend beyond the traditional boundaries of the financial market.
In Brazil, news coverage of Daniel Vorcaro reached his connections with businesspeople, public officials, and religious leaders.
In Paraguay, the presence of figures such as Joshua Abreu, active in both religious settings and financial institutions, added another dimension to the networks of relationships associated with Ueno.
The Paraguayan group’s international connections took clearer shape with the bank’s presence at the Mar-a-Lago gala and the approach of operatives linked to political movements in different countries.
These networks show how economic power moves through business, political, religious, and diplomatic spaces, expanding opportunities for dialogue, public visibility, and influence.
The movement of executives, consultants, investors, and operatives through diverse institutional settings makes it possible to observe forms of coordination that do not always appear in corporate organizational charts or financial statements.
In both cases, mapping these relationships adds context to the examination of formal regulatory mechanisms.
The simultaneous presence of financial interests, public authorities, and networks of influence offers a relevant field for understanding the processes through which certain economic groups expand their access to structures of power.
The journalistic challenge is to connect these ties to the institutional and economic decisions that are actually documented.
Regulatory narco-statization as an analytical tool
Lawfare4All uses the term regulatory narco-statization as an analytical tool to examine the relationship between potentially illicit capital, public oversight structures, and mechanisms of institutional capture.
Its purpose is not to create a new criminal category, but to offer a perspective for observing processes through which private economic interests can influence or instrumentalize state functions intended for financial control.
The prefix narco refers to the historical discussion of the infiltration of illicit economies into public institutions, without limiting the phenomenon to drug trafficking.
Money laundering can involve funds derived from different criminal activities, including corruption, fraud, smuggling, and drug trafficking.
The tool makes it possible to consider the movement of executives between state and market, supervisors’ independence, prudential assessment mechanisms, political relationships, the movement of capital among related companies, and exposure of public funds.
It also makes it possible to distinguish different problems: administrative errors, oversight deficiencies, conflicts of interest, improper favors, and possible criminal conduct.
Applying the comparison to the Master and Ueno cases does not require assuming identical trajectories. On the contrary, the differences between the two countries help explain the multiple ways in which relations between economic power and public authority can develop.
The divan of regulatory narco-statization is therefore a space for critical analysis of institutional mechanisms, not an instrument for preemptive condemnation.
Two banks, two countries, and the state facing itself in the mirror
The Master and Ueno crises had different outcomes.
In Brazil, the liquidation triggered criminal investigations, controversies over transactions with public institutions, and questions related to the Central Bank’s conduct under different administrations.
In Paraguay, Ueno’s resolution was accompanied by an institutional crisis that reached the leadership of the government and the monetary authority.
The differences between the episodes do not diminish the importance of their points of convergence. On the contrary, they make it possible to observe how distinct political, regulatory, and financial structures respond to similar challenges.
The two banks did not develop outside the state.
Their transformations depended on administrative approvals, technical assessments, and supervision mechanisms that conditioned their growth prospects.
In Brazil, Master’s trajectory necessarily passes through the decisions made under Campos Neto, the oversight procedures of subsequent years, and the liquidation ordered in 2025.
In Paraguay, Ueno’s path involves the movement of executives between the financial sector and the Central Bank, authorization to operate as a bank, the acquisition of Visión, the prudential treatment of assets, and warnings about transactions with related companies.
Ueno’s presence in Mar-a-Lago adds an international political dimension to this trajectory, revealing the breadth of its relationships during a period when the bank was also conducting operations later questioned by supervisors.
In both cases, examining the financial episodes leads to a broader discussion about the autonomy of regulatory institutions in the face of economic and political interests.
The question of the state’s capacity to control financial power becomes as important as investigating the transactions carried out by the banks themselves.
It is on this terrain that regulatory narco-statization offers its contribution as a journalistic tool: broadening observation of the relationships among regulation, finance, and power.
Master and Ueno do not need to belong to the same network for their trajectories to raise common questions.
The similarities deserve attention because they put under scrutiny the functioning of institutions intended to protect the financial system and, consequently, public assets.
The problem is not only understanding how two banks reached crisis. It is understanding how the systems tasked with supervising them monitored the entire journey.
On the divan of this dynamic duo, the main characters are not only the bankers.
Central banks also have a great deal to explain.
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Lawfare4All | Comparative journalistic analysis
Methodological note: Regulatory narco-statization is used as an analytical tool to examine possible patterns of influence and institutional capture. The article does not establish criminal liability or presume illicit ties between the banks compared. Allegations regarding individual conduct remain subject to investigations and decisions by the competent authorities.