Lawfare Did Not Begin in Curitiba: From the Coup Against Dilma to Total-Spectrum Legal Warfare

From the removal of Dilma Rousseff to the transnationalization of criminal, electoral, commercial and diplomatic offensives against Brazilian democracy

Fernando Fagundes Ferreira · 2026-07-29

Research Article — Investigation in Progress. This text presents an analytical hypothesis that will be submitted to the Lawfare4All methodological instruments. At this stage, it does not constitute a definitive Assessment Tool™ result or a completed Case Study.

Lawfare against Brazilian democracy did not begin with the conviction of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. Nor can it be understood as a series of isolated episodes, disconnected from one another and produced by actors who merely coincided in time.

Its political genealogy goes back to the institutional rupture that removed Dilma Rousseff from the Presidency in 2016, interrupting the mandate she had won at the polls two years earlier.

From that moment on, different instruments began performing successive and complementary functions. Political-constitutional law was mobilized to remove the government. Criminal procedure was used to criminalize the political field capable of rebuilding it. Lula's conviction produced his exclusion from the 2018 election. The contestation of the ballot then sought to prevent or delegitimize the electoral return of that project. Now, according to the hypothesis developed by Marina Basso Lacerda in an article published by CartaCapital, the offensive is taking on a transnational dimension and operating simultaneously through the criminal, electoral, commercial, regulatory and diplomatic pathways.

This is not, therefore, simply a first and a second lawfare cleanly separated.

It may be a long strategic sequence, in which instruments change as previous ones are exhausted, fail, lose legitimacy or cease to deliver the expected results.

The historical synthesis is stark:

First they removed the government. Then they removed the candidate. When the candidate returned and won, they began placing the ballot itself, the new government and Brazilian sovereignty under suspicion.

The hypothesis of this article is that this sequence reveals more than occasional convergence. It suggests strategic continuity, progressive adaptation of means and articulation between domestic actors and external structures of power.

On the international plane, the United States Department of State appears as a possible political-diplomatic core of this architecture. This does not mean that the DoS directly executes each sanction, criminal case, commercial investigation or financial pressure. The instruments are distributed among different bodies and levels. The Department of Justice acts on the criminal front; the USTR, on the commercial front; Treasury and OFAC, on sanctions; the White House and its strategic councils, on higher-level decisions.

The Department of State's function would be different: to connect interlocutors, narratives, geopolitical priorities and interagency mechanisms.

In synthesis:

The Department of State would provide political direction and diplomatic legitimacy; other bodies would provide the legal, commercial, financial and sanctions-related instruments.

This is an investigative hypothesis of Lawfare4All. Its demonstration will depend on the examination of documents, agendas, meetings, diplomatic communications, records of contact, declassified archives and correspondence between US authorities and Brazilian actors.

The first stage: removing the elected government

The removal of Dilma Rousseff constitutes the starting point of this genealogy.

The central instrument, at that moment, was not criminal prosecution. It was political-constitutional law, mobilized through impeachment.

Budgetary and administrative practices were converted into grounds for the definitive removal of an elected president. The controversy over the so-called "pedaladas fiscais" was elevated to the status of a crime of responsibility, despite intense dispute over personal authorship, legal typicity, the seriousness of the conduct and the proportionality of the sanction imposed.

The process brought together elements that would reappear in the following stages:

• expansive interpretation of norms;
• strategic use of formal procedures;
• public anticipation of the verdict;
• parliamentary mobilization;
• economic pressure;
• intensive media coverage;
• prior deterioration of the target's legitimacy;
• production of a political outcome through legal language.

The immediate target was Dilma Rousseff.

The structural effect was broader: to remove from government the political project that had won the 2014 election and to reorganize the balance of forces without holding a new presidential race.

Law did not appear as a rupture of order. It appeared as the language of legitimation of the rupture.

This is a central feature of lawfare: power does not need to act against legality when it can produce an interpretation of legality capable of giving institutional appearance to a previously intended political result.

Impeachment should not be examined only as a parliamentary episode. It must be situated within a sequence in which the removal of the government opened the way to the criminalization of its political field, to the exclusion of its principal electoral leadership and to the reconstruction of the State under a different economic and institutional orientation.

The second stage: criminalizing the political field

Lava Jato deepened the process initiated by the 2016 rupture.

If impeachment had removed the government, criminal procedure went on to strike at the political field capable of returning to power.

The main framing was corruption. The privileged legal field was criminal law. The institutional geography was concentrated in Curitiba. The instruments included pretrial detentions, coercive summonses, plea agreements, selective leaks, media spectacle and expansive procedural interpretations.

Lawfare against Lula therefore had a clearly identifiable center of gravity.

Its principal alibi was the fight against corruption. Its legal armament was made up of criminal norms, precautionary measures, plea agreements and expansive interpretations of jurisdiction. Its externalities were produced by intensive media coverage, selective circulation of information and public anticipation of guilt.

In the first criminal cycle, forum shopping occurred predominantly within the Brazilian justice system. Fixing jurisdiction at the 13th Federal Criminal Court of Curitiba — including through expansive interpretations of the connection between the facts and Petrobras — became a central element of the procedural architecture that sustained the offensive against Lula.

Public narrative frequently transformed suspicions into certainties, investigations into social convictions and prosecutorial versions into settled facts.

The judicial process produced effects long before any final judgment.

This point is essential. Lawfare does not depend exclusively on a definitive sentence. It can achieve its objectives through attrition, reputational destruction, loss of political capacity, imprisonment, financial disorganization or electoral exclusion.

Lava Jato did not act only upon individuals. It reconfigured the economic, political and informational environment. Companies were destroyed or weakened, productive sectors disorganized, parties asymmetrically hit and leaders converted into symbols of a criminality presented as inherent to a particular political field.

Criminal law thus became a technology of political reorganization.

The third stage: removing the candidate

The conviction and imprisonment of Lula turned criminalization into electoral interdiction.

The political effect was unequivocal: the leading candidate in the polls was barred from running in the 2018 presidential election.

The removal of Dilma had taken the government. The conviction of Lula prevented the same political field from immediately returning to power through the ballot.

At that moment, lawfare reached its most visible electoral form.

Criminal procedure no longer produced only individual legal consequences. It directly altered the conditions of democratic competition.

The election was held without the candidate who led the polls.

Even if each decision was presented in isolation as regular application of the law, the whole produced a political effect of enormous magnitude: the reorganization of the presidential race.

Analysis of lawfare cannot, therefore, be limited to the question of whether processes, appeals and decisions formally exist.

It must examine:

• selectivity;
• jurisdiction;
• proportionality;
• temporality;
• jurisprudential coherence;
• narrative externalities;
• electoral effects;
• comparative treatment of similar cases;
• connection between the judicial decision and the political outcome.

Law can be formally present and, still, be instrumentalized.

The removal of Lula from the 2018 election does not appear, in this genealogy, as the incidental consequence of a criminal case. It constitutes the third functional stage of the sequence: after removing the government and criminalizing its political field, the leader most capable of bringing it back to power was removed from the election.

The fourth stage: preventing or delegitimizing the return

The election of Jair Bolsonaro did not close the cycle.

It opened a phase of political and institutional consolidation of the effects previously produced.

With Lula's recovery of political rights and his electoral victory in 2022, the strategy had to be adapted again.

The target was no longer only a government or a candidate. It became the very electoral mechanism that had allowed that political field to return to power.

The contestation of the ballot, the repeated production of doubts about the electronic voting system, mobilizations against institutions and attempts to invalidate the result performed a new function: to prevent the inauguration or delegitimize the elected government in advance.

Legal crisis began to be prepared even before the electoral process had concluded.

This dynamic can be called legal pre-constitution of crisis.

Instead of reacting to a proven irregularity, a stockpile of allegations is built in advance, ready to be reused if the ballot result is unfavorable.

Petitions, speeches, reports, videos, foreign statements and unproven accusations can be converted into raw material for future contestations.

Lawfare, at this stage, does not depend on immediate judicial victory.

Its function may be to produce suspicion; to create headlines; to formally register an accusation; to generate equivalence between fact and allegation; to keep a political base mobilized; to provide justification for subsequent measures; to build the idea that the electoral result was born illegitimate.

Defeat at the polls does not close the dispute.

It activates the narrative prepared beforehand.

The fifth stage: transnationalization

It is here that the hypothesis presented by Marina Basso Lacerda gains special importance.

The so-called second lawfare would not be an entirely new offensive, disconnected from the previous ones. It would represent the internationalization and legal diversification of a process that has already passed through impeachment, criminal prosecution, electoral interdiction and attempts at institutional rupture.

The new phase preserves three classical elements:

• strategic choice of geography;
• selection of legal armament;
• production of narrative externalities.

The content of each element, however, changes.

The alibi is no longer only corruption and now includes narcoterrorism, foreign financing, electoral fraud, censorship, political persecution, discriminatory trade practices and threats to national security.

Geography is no longer concentrated in Curitiba and now includes Brasília and Washington.

The armament expands:

• criminal law;
• electoral law;
• trade law;
• financial sanctions;
• tariffs;
• terrorism-related designations;
• visa restrictions;
• extraterritorial investigations;
• compliance systems;
• diplomatic mechanisms;
• payment infrastructures;
• digital trade;
• pressure on authorities and institutions.

The target is no longer exclusively a person.

Now placed under suspicion are:

• the electoral process;
• the elected government;
• the payments system;
• regulatory policy;
• judicial institutions;
• diplomatic autonomy;
• Brazilian economic sovereignty.

The possible role of the Department of State

The transnationalization hypothesis requires identifying not only the instruments, but also the centers of articulation.

Institutional dispersion may create the impression that each measure belongs to an independent universe.

Criminal cases would be a matter for the Department of Justice.

Sanctions would belong to Treasury and OFAC.

Tariffs and commercial investigations would be handled by the USTR.

Diplomatic pressure would be attributed to the Department of State.

Broader strategic decisions could involve the White House, the National Security Council or the National Economic Council.

This formal division of competences does not preclude a common political direction.

The hypothesis of this study is that the Department of State functions as the political-diplomatic core of the architecture, connecting Brazilian interlocutors, foreign policy objectives, framings on democracy and security, and mechanisms operated by other agencies.

The "situation room" does not need to sign every act.

Its function may be to select interlocutors; produce or legitimize narratives; organize diplomatic priorities; transmit political signals; bring internal and external actors closer; connect formally distinct measures; turn domestic disputes into foreign policy topics; coordinate or facilitate interagency responses.

In this configuration, the DoS would not necessarily be the formal executor of every measure, but the political center capable of integrating them within a common geopolitical orientation.

The Department of State would provide political direction and diplomatic legitimacy; other bodies would provide the legal, commercial, financial and sanctions-related instruments.

This hypothesis requires documentary investigation.

It will be necessary to examine official agendas; diplomatic meetings; visits and hearings; cables; internal communications; correspondence between agencies; declassified documents; records of contact with Brazilian politicians and organizations; temporal coherence between diplomatic contacts and measures adopted.

The purpose is not to replace documentation with intuition.

It is to recognize that the US architecture operates in an interagency mode and that formal fragmentation of competences may conceal the political unity of orientations.

Total-spectrum dominance, hybrid warfare and lawfare

One of the merits of the CartaCapital article lies in organizing concepts that often appear mixed together.

They are not synonymous.

Total-spectrum dominance represents the broadest objective: to achieve superiority in different fields of dispute — legal, economic, informational, technological, diplomatic, financial and institutional.

Hybrid warfare describes the mode of action. Instead of open military aggression or an acknowledged classical coup, it uses a combination of indirect pressures, narrative operations, economic coercion, regulatory disputes, institutional instrumentalization and legal conflict.

Lawfare functions as the means of operationalization.

It allows acts of coercion to appear clothed in legal normality.

A sanction can be presented as an administrative measure. A tariff can appear as trade defense. An electoral petition can be described as regular exercise of the right to petition. A terrorism-related designation can be justified as security policy. A foreign investigation can take on the appearance of ordinary legal cooperation.

Each act, in isolation, can retain legal form.

The methodological question is whether these acts remain independent or display temporal, narrative, functional and documentary links sufficient to characterize a lawfare architecture.

The three pathways of the transnational stage

The author organizes the current phase into three simultaneous pathways: criminal, electoral and commercial.

The criminal pathway

In the first lawfare, the central framing was corruption.

In the transnational stage, according to the hypothesis presented, the criminal axis shifts to even more serious and exceptional categories:

• narcoterrorism;
• illicit transnational financing;
• material support to terrorist organizations;
• international political criminality;
• networks of collaboration among governments, parties and armed organizations.

This shift is not merely rhetorical.

The antiterrorism framing tends to expand jurisdictional reach, financial surveillance, police cooperation, asset freezing, criminalization of support networks, procedural exceptionality, reputational effects and the possibility of extraterritorial sanctions.

The article gives relevance to the circulation of statements by Hugo Carvajal, a former member of the Venezuelan state apparatus now subject to US justice.

Allegations previously rejected, discredited or uncorroborated may acquire new political weight when they enter another institutional environment, particularly when associated with narratives about narcoterrorism, the financing of the Latin American left and electoral manipulation.

A typical lawfare concern emerges here: the transformation of legally vulnerable collaborators into producers of narratives with the appearance of evidence.

A statement does not become true merely because it has been inserted into a case or presented by someone cooperating with authorities.

Its reliability depends on independent corroboration; adversarial contradiction; internal consistency; material documentation; analysis of the collaborator's incentives; verification of the expected benefits; and an effective possibility of contestation.

The existence of a criminal case is a fact. The political extension attributed to statements is another question and must be examined separately.

The electoral pathway

The second front involves the advance production of doubt about the Brazilian election.

The thesis presented links electoral petitions, questioning of voting systems, references to Venezuela, mentions of Smartmatic, allegations of foreign financing, expressions such as "digital criminal organization" and the mobilization of foreign interlocutors and authorities.

The objective does not need to be an immediate judicial victory.

An electoral petition can perform political functions even when rejected. It can turn a narrative into an institutional document, produce headlines, formally register an accusation, provide material for new petitions, prepare future impugnation, create the appearance of legal controversy and sustain the claim that the result was born under suspicion.

Contestation does not necessarily begin after the election. It can be prepared before it.

In this logic, lawfare operates by maintaining continuous suspicion.

It is necessary, however, to distinguish legitimate oversight of the electoral process; the repetition of unproven allegations; the political instrumentalization of such allegations; and coordination intended to delegitimize the result in advance.

The first level does not automatically prove the others.

The commercial and regulatory pathway

The third front is perhaps the most innovative for contemporary lawfare theory.

It includes tariffs, sanctions, commercial investigations, digital trade, financial services, payment systems, platforms, compliance, technology regulation and diplomatic pressures.

Pix occupies a central place in this discussion.

Created as a public instant-payments infrastructure, the system has reduced costs, expanded access to financial transactions and profoundly changed the Brazilian market. Its success has also affected traditional intermediaries and foreign business interests.

A national public policy can thus receive opposing framings.

In Brazil, it can be described as innovation, financial inclusion, efficiency and digital sovereignty.

Abroad, it can be presented as a trade barrier, state favoritism, a discriminatory practice or a threat to private companies.

It is in this translation that a commercial controversy can take on a political function.

The tariff ceases to be merely an economic instrument. It communicates that certain sovereign decisions may generate external punishment.

The administrative investigation ceases to be merely technical. It defines the vocabulary through which a national policy will be judged internationally.

The sanction ceases to affect only its formal target. It reaches banks, companies, platforms, authorities and institutions that begin to anticipate risks.

This does not mean that every commercial measure is lawfare.

States defend their markets, investigate economic practices and apply tariffs.

Characterization requires examining selectivity, proportionality, grounds, context, effects, comparative treatment, declared objective, connection with political disputes and articulation with other fronts of pressure.

From Brasília to Curitiba and Washington

The change of geography is one of the keys to the hypothesis.

The historical sequence may be summarized as follows:

• Brasília was the political-constitutional center of Dilma's removal;
• Curitiba became the criminal center of Lula's criminalization;
• Brasília became again the electoral and institutional field of the 2022 contestation;
• Washington emerges as a criminal, commercial, financial and diplomatic forum for the transnational stage.

The central formulation becomes:

Lawfare began with the removal of the government in Brasília, was consolidated by criminalization in Curitiba and now seeks to shift part of its center of gravity to Washington.

In the first criminal cycle, forum shopping took place predominantly within the Brazilian justice system. Fixing jurisdiction at the 13th Federal Criminal Court of Curitiba — including through expansive interpretations of the connection between the facts and Petrobras — became a central element of the procedural architecture that sustained the offensive against Lula.

In the new stage, the forum considered most functional may lie outside Brazilian territory.

US jurisdiction has instruments of extraordinary material reach: extraterritorial criminal cases; sanctions; freezes; visa restrictions; commercial investigations; influence over dollar-denominated operations; the capacity to induce global compliance; terrorism-related designations; diplomatic pressure; market power.

This creates a form of geopolitical forum shopping.

The choice of jurisdiction no longer depends only on the most convenient norm. It also depends on the foreign State's capacity to produce global effects.

Law acts together with the financial system, banking networks, trade, digital platforms and diplomacy.

Legal sovereignty and economic sovereignty become inseparable.

Planning by stages

The sequence does not need to have been designed in its entirety from the outset to be planned.

Prolonged political strategies also unfold in phases. Each victory opens the way to the next stage. Each failure produces an adaptation. Each exhausted instrument is replaced by another.

Impeachment created the political rupture.

Lava Jato criminalized the defeated field.

The exclusion of Lula reorganized the 2018 election.

The contestation of the ballot tried to prevent or delegitimize the return in 2022.

The transnational front expands pressure beyond Brazilian institutions.

Continuity lies less in the need for absolute identity among all agents and more in the conscious reuse of the structures, narratives and results previously produced.

The trajectory reveals strategic continuity, progressive coordination, adaptation of means, institutional learning, reuse of narratives, geographic expansion, legal diversification and accumulation of political effects.

It is not necessary to imagine that all participants have been gathered, since 2016, around a single document capable of foreseeing every future stage.

The existence of a prolonged strategy can be demonstrated by the way previous outcomes are used to open new fronts, how actors connect, how narratives migrate between institutions and how different instruments begin to operate in a common direction.

The "situation room" hypothesis adds an organizing element: the Department of State would be the political-diplomatic center capable of articulating the external plan and connecting different branches of the US administration to Brazilian actors.

This hypothesis needs to be documented, but it should not be dismissed merely because execution appears distributed among several agencies.

The dispersion of instruments may be precisely the operational form of the strategy.

The inversion of sovereigntist discourse

The transnational stage exposes a deep political contradiction.

Sectors that denounce globalism and claim to defend national sovereignty turn to foreign authorities to pressure Brazilian institutions, raise the economic cost of internal decisions, promote sanctions, question elections, constrain authorities and displace national conflicts to foreign jurisdictions.

Sovereignty ceases to function as a universal principle.

It is invoked against national institutions that limit the group's own interests. At the same time, it is relativized when a foreign power offers instruments against internal adversaries.

A form of selective sovereigntism emerges:

Foreign intervention is condemned when it harms one's own field and celebrated when it constrains its adversaries.

This paradox is not merely discursive. It can produce economic, legal and institutional consequences for the whole of Brazilian society.

Adversarial appropriation of language

Another important element is the inversion of categories previously used to describe the far right.

Terms such as digital militia, criminal organization, censorship, persecution, authoritarianism, fraud and lawfare come to be appropriated and turned back against adversaries.

This is not merely rhetorical incoherence.

The appropriation performs strategic functions: it assigns the group the role of victim; it neutralizes previous accusations; it creates false equivalence; it reuses already legitimized concepts; it makes it harder to distinguish among cases; it converts political language into legal argument.

Language is copied, inverted and filed.

This process can be defined as adversarial appropriation of legal language.

It shows that lawfare is not limited to the use of norms and processes. It also involves the dispute over the capacity to define publicly who is a victim, who is an aggressor, what is legality and what should be perceived as persecution.

How Lawfare4All will evaluate this sequence

The CartaCapital article offers a decisive analytical hypothesis, but does not close the investigation.

Lawfare4All has begun evaluating this genealogy through Investigation File 001 — From Domestic Lawfare to Transnational Pressure, structured around a Framework Review, evidence matrix, timeline, map of actors and institutions, documents, gaps and alternative explanations.

Open Investigation File 001 →

Analytical Framework™

The framework will examine strategic choice of jurisdiction, instrumentalization of norms, changes in legal armament, narrative externalities, extraterritoriality, institutional asymmetry, anticipated political damage, economic coercion, electoral delegitimization, risks to sovereignty, continuity between phases, the role of interagency structures and possible centers of diplomatic articulation.

Assessment Tool™

The structured assessment must register indicators present, favorable evidence, contrary evidence, sources, documentary gaps, alternative hypotheses, level of confidence and provisional result for each dimension.

Methodology

The methodology will rigorously distinguish official facts, corroborated facts, allegations, declared connections, strong inferences, moderate inferences, hypotheses, contested claims and insufficient evidence.

Case Study

The case study will present a timeline beginning at impeachment, actors, institutions, jurisdictions, legal mechanisms, primary sources, secondary sources, documented relationships, inferred relationships, alternative explanations, revision history, map of interagency relations and possible connections with the Department of State.

Public Intelligibility Review™

The PIR™ will assess whether the acts involved were intelligible and contestable by the public. Among the questions: Was the legal basis clear? Was the evidence accessible? Did institutional language distinguish facts from accusations? Was the measure proportional? Were the criteria applied uniformly? Was there an effective opportunity for defense? Did the formal objective match the concrete effects? Was the public able to understand what was being decided? Were international connections made public? Were the roles of the different agencies transparent?

Research Advisory

The study will be submitted to external review, in particular regarding the use of the concept of "coup," the delimitation of lawfare, the comparison among phases, the sufficiency of sources, the role of the Department of State, the existence of interagency coordination, alternative explanations, the risk of overinterpretation and the historical consistency of the genealogy.

Conclusion: a long, adaptive and internationalized strategy

The hypothesis of the second lawfare becomes more powerful when placed within a broader genealogy.

The phenomenon did not begin in Curitiba.

It began with the use of political-constitutional law to remove Dilma Rousseff from the Presidency.

Then criminal procedure was used to criminalize the political field defeated at impeachment.

The conviction of Lula enabled his exclusion from the 2018 election.

The contestation of the ballot tried to prevent or delegitimize his return in 2022.

With the failure of domestic strategies of interdiction and rupture, the conflict began to seek new forums, new categories and new instruments.

Narcoterrorism, sanctions, tariffs, digital trade, Pix, extraterritorial jurisdiction and diplomatic pressure may represent the most recent stage of this adaptation.

The sequence can be summarized as follows:

From impeachment to criminal prosecution, from criminal prosecution to electoral exclusion, from electoral exclusion to attacks on the ballot, and from domestic contestation to transnational pressure.

Planning does not have to mean that every stage was designed in every detail from the outset. It can mean an adaptive strategy, conducted in phases, in which each result is reused and each setback produces a new form of intervention.

On the external plane, the Department of State emerges as a hypothesized political-diplomatic center of this architecture. Its function would not necessarily be to carry out every act, but to connect interlocutors, geopolitical priorities, narratives and instruments distributed among different bodies.

The question that will guide the Lawfare4All investigation is, therefore, more precise:

Are we facing independent episodes, or a prolonged strategy of destabilization, articulated in stages, capable of switching legal instrument, jurisdiction and narrative whenever the previous mechanism ceases to fulfill its political function?

And on the international plane:

Did the Department of State function as the political-diplomatic center of this transnationalization, while other agencies supplied the criminal, commercial, financial and sanctions-related instruments?

The purpose is not to substitute evidence with conviction.

It is to organize the facts, identify the centers of articulation, test the connections, confront alternative hypotheses and make publicly intelligible what, under the appearance of legality, may operate as a continuous mechanism of power.

Investigation Notice

This article inaugurates a Lawfare4All investigation into the historical continuity between the impeachment of Dilma Rousseff, the criminalization of Lula, his exclusion from the 2018 election, the contestation of the 2022 result and the current transnationalization of legal, electoral, commercial and diplomatic offensives.

The investigation will also examine the hypothesis that the United States Department of State has functioned as the political-diplomatic center of this architecture, connecting Brazilian actors, geopolitical priorities and mechanisms operated by other US agencies.

The hypothesis will be submitted to the Analytical Framework™, the Assessment Tool™ and the case-study methodology of the Hub. Results will be published with a clear distinction between documented facts, allegations, inferences and issues not yet proven.

Initial analytical source

Marina Basso Lacerda. "Guerra de espectro total: a genealogia do segundo lawfare contra um governo de centro-esquerda no Brasil." CartaCapital.

*Primary-source verification in progress.*

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The investigation is now open in the Hub. Consult Investigation File 001 and follow the Framework Review, evidence matrix, timeline, documents and remaining evidentiary gaps.

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