From the Diretas Já to the Streets of 2026: The Dispute over the Nature of the Brazilian State
The election is the circumstance. The nature of the State is the object of the dispute. The streets are the social expression of this conflict.
Fernando Fagundes Ferreira ·
In 1984, millions of Brazilians occupied streets and squares to demand the right to directly choose the president of the Republic. Forty-two years later, a new wave of popular mobilizations raises a fundamental question for Brazilian democracy once again: not only who will wield power, but in service of whom the State will be governed.
The demonstrations that gained strength after the first round of the presidential elections, on October 4, emerge in a context profoundly different from the one faced by the Diretas Já movement. Brazil has a democratic Constitution, holds direct elections, and has formally independent institutions. The threat perceived by part of society, however, does not necessarily require the suppression of these structures. It can manifest itself through their progressive capture, the instrumentalization of legality, and the submission of public decisions to political, economic, and criminal interests.
The comparison with 1984 does not depend on equivalences between regimes or on the size of the crowds. Its foundation lies in the nature of the dispute: in both moments, popular mobilization calls into question the limits and legitimacy of the exercise of power.
The election is the circumstance. The nature of the State is the object of the dispute. The streets are the social expression of this conflict.
The streets go beyond the campaigns
The movement that spread across the country in the days following the first round gained momentum among students, even before the centralized reorganization of the electoral campaigns. In Rio de Janeiro, thousands of university and high school students took part in a march from Candelária to Cinelândia. Other demonstrations took place in state capitals such as Salvador, Porto Alegre, and Curitiba, while student organizations expanded their calendar of actions to dozens of universities.
This Sunday's mobilization, October 11, represents a new stage of this articulation. Student, union, and social movement organizations called for demonstrations in different regions, including rallies on Avenida Paulista, in São Paulo, and at Parque 13 de Maio, in Recife.
The demands include the defense of public education, labor rights, national sovereignty, and democratic institutions. Support for the reelection of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and opposition to the candidacy of Flávio Bolsonaro constitute an explicit part of the mobilization, but do not exhaust its political content.
The transformation of an electoral agenda into a discussion about the foundations of the State is the central phenomenon of this analysis.
Society does not necessarily mobilize only to replace or preserve those in government. It can also occupy public space to establish limits on the exercise of power, demand institutional guarantees, and react to the perception of threats to the democratic regime.
It is in this sense that the demonstrations of October 2026 should be examined: as the expression of a conflict that runs through the presidential dispute but reaches broader questions about the future of Brazilian democracy.
The State can be captured without ceasing to appear democratic
Historical experience shows that democratic erosion does not depend exclusively on explicit institutional ruptures. Power can be concentrated gradually, through the reduction of public controls, the compromising of institutional autonomy, and the expansion of networks of influence incompatible with the collective interest.
In this process, the Constitution need not be formally revoked, Parliament can continue legislating, the courts can continue judging, and elections can continue to take place.
The persistence of these procedures, however, does not ensure that institutions fully retain their democratic purpose.
The fundamental question ceases to be merely the formal existence of mechanisms of representation and comes to include the autonomy of public decisions, the integrity of political processes, and society's capacity to oversee those who exercise authority in its name.
Who influences the State? With what resources? Through which mechanisms? Under what conditions of transparency and accountability?
A democracy loses substance when its institutions cease to operate primarily according to public rules and come to systematically serve particular networks of power.
It is precisely at this border between political representation and institutional capture that one of the most relevant questions of contemporary Brazil is found.
The risk of narco-statization
The infiltration of criminal organizations into public institutions is not merely a security problem. It is also a threat to popular sovereignty, to the integrity of elections, and to the autonomy of the State itself.
The term “narco-statization” describes a process in which organizations associated with illicit markets seek to convert economic resources and coercive power into political influence and institutional protection.
This process can involve clandestine campaign financing, corruption of public officials, territorial control, voter intimidation, interference in appointments, and indirect participation in administrative decisions.
The risk is not limited to any one ideology or party. Criminal organizations tend to seek opportunities for influence wherever they find access to resources, protection, and power.
On June 26, 2026, the Electoral Public Prosecutor's Office issued guidelines for political parties to adopt procedures aimed at preventing the infiltration of criminal organizations into their structures and candidacies. The initiative institutionally acknowledges the need to confront the influence of these networks on political representation.
This acknowledgment is important: organized crime does not threaten democracy only through the violence it exerts outside institutions, but also through the possibility of penetrating the mechanisms meant to represent and protect society.
The concept of narco-statization does not mean that Brazil is already entirely subjected to organized crime. It does, however, make it possible to investigate the mechanisms through which illicit interests can progressively expand their power over public structures.
The difference is decisive. A State does not need to have been completely captured for the process of capture to constitute a relevant institutional risk.
The dispute over legality
The preservation of institutions also requires examining how legal instruments are used in disputes for power.
The concept of “lawfare”, understood as the strategic use of legal mechanisms to achieve political or economic objectives through deviations of purpose, makes it possible to investigate situations in which legality can be instrumentalized.
This is not about confusing the legitimate application of the law with political persecution. On the contrary: the distinction depends on identifying irregularities, undue selectivity, violations of guarantees, and the use of public powers for purposes incompatible with the legal order.
The question acquires particular relevance in contexts of institutional capture, in which the appearance of legal normalcy can make it difficult to identify the interests actually benefited by public decisions.
Formal authority is not sufficient to ensure democratic legitimacy.
An investigation, a trial, an administrative decision, or a regulatory measure must also be examined in relation to their reasoning, transparency, proportionality, and compliance with constitutional guarantees.
Democracy requires more than institutions capable of exercising power. It requires institutions capable of publicly justifying its exercise.
The Diretas Já and popular sovereignty
In 1984, Brazil lived under a military dictatorship, and direct presidential elections remained prohibited. The Dante de Oliveira Amendment became the main legislative instrument of a demand that transcended party lines.
The demonstrations brought together workers, students, artists, social movements, and political leaders in extraordinary proportions. According to historical records from the Chamber of Deputies, the rally held in April 1984 at the Vale do Anhangabaú, in São Paulo, gathered approximately 1.7 million people.
The proposal to restore direct elections was rejected in the Chamber of Deputies on April 25, despite 298 votes in favor. It fell 22 votes short of the constitutional quorum required.
The legislative defeat, however, did not end the historic significance of the movement.
The Diretas Já helped change the balance of political forces, weaken the support sustaining the military regime, and consolidate popular participation as a central element of the democratic transition.
Its main contribution was to demonstrate that popular sovereignty does not depend solely on existing institutional procedures. It also manifests itself in society's capacity to demand changes in the very mechanisms through which power is exercised.
The difference between 1984 and 2026 is evident. The Brazilian population already has the right to vote directly for president. Today's discussion, therefore, is not about winning that procedure, but about preserving the institutional conditions for it to continue effectively representing the popular will.
In 1984, society demanded the democratization of the choice of government. In 2026, the demonstrations make it possible to raise once again the discussion about preserving the democratic nature of the State.
Fear and collective mobilization
Social movements do not arise only in response to rights already lost or institutions already destroyed. They also form in the face of the perception of future threats.
Fear, in this context, is not necessarily an expression of passivity. It can function as an element of collective mobilization, especially when different groups recognize shared risks to the conditions of their political and social existence.
Concern for social rights, the preservation of public universities, civil liberties, national sovereignty, and institutional integrity make up a field of demands that goes beyond the day-to-day administration of government.
The growing articulation among students, workers, civil organizations, and political movements indicates that the electoral debate connects to broader expectations about the country's future.
The interpretation of these demonstrations as a reaction to the threat of a transformation in the nature of the State finds meaning in this convergence of concerns.
This does not require that all participants use the same political vocabulary or share a single definition of the existing threats. Historical mobilizations frequently bring together distinct demands around common structural issues.
The decisive element lies in the passage from individual concern to public demonstration, from the perception of risk to collective action.
Democracy does not end at the ballot box
The presidential elections of October 25 will decide the composition of the next federal government, but they will not put an end to the problems related to the influence of organized crime, the autonomy of institutions, and the quality of democratic representation.
No electoral outcome, on its own, replaces the need for public oversight, transparency, accountability, and social participation.
The dispute over the nature of the State continues regardless of the alternation between governments, because it involves the structural conditions of the exercise of power.
The Diretas Já demonstrated that Brazilian society is capable of turning the defense of popular sovereignty into a movement of historic reach. The demonstrations of October 2026 bring this tradition of public participation back to face threats and concerns specific to a different juncture.
The comparison between the two moments does not consist in declaring that history repeats itself. It consists in recognizing the persistence of a question that runs through different stages of Brazilian democracy: society's capacity to determine the limits, the purpose, and the beneficiaries of political power.
In 1984, the people took to the streets to win the right to choose who would govern. In 2026, the streets raise an equally fundamental question once again: what nature will the State have, governed by those whom the people choose?
Because a democracy is not defined only by who holds power, but also by the interests that power serves.
The election is the circumstance. The nature of the State is the object of the dispute. The streets are the social expression of this conflict.