Democracy Does Not Need Miracle-Working Saints
Amid digital troops, electoral armies, and communication heroes, Brazilian politics faces a structural contradiction: mobilizing millions of citizens does not necessarily democratize the means through which they obtain information, express themselves, and participate in decision-making.
Fernando Fagundes Ferreira ·
Amid digital troops, electoral armies, and communication heroes, Brazilian politics faces a structural contradiction: mobilizing millions of citizens does not necessarily democratize the means through which they obtain information, express themselves, and participate in decision-making.
The Economist magazine’s consecration of André Janones as a hero of the Brazilian left, in a November 5, 2026 report titled “André ‘Mad Dog’ Janones is a hero of the Brazilian left”, offers a seductive narrative to explain Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s reelection. A combative congressman, millions of followers gathered on WhatsApp, and a digital operation capable of competing for public attention with opponents who have invested for years in political organization on platforms. The plot brings together the ingredients of an electoral comeback story, but leaves in the background a question that predates the rise of this character: Brazil’s persistent difficulty in building a policy to democratize communication.
This is not a matter of denying Janones’s contribution, nor of diminishing the work of the participants in his network. The so-called Lula Army demonstrated an ability to mobilize, distribute content, and coordinate digital initiatives. Its activities also included calls for in-person demonstrations, establishing connections between the circulation of messages and mobilization in the streets. The existence of these connections, however, does not justify attributing authorship of an electoral process involving parties, unions, social movements, collectives, independent activists, and millions of citizens to a single organization.
The size of the audience does not resolve the question of persuasive effectiveness either. The 10.8 million followers reported by the press indicate potential reach, not the number of voters persuaded to change their position. A network made up predominantly of supporters already identified with a particular candidacy can perform important functions in mobilization, amplification, and encouraging voter turnout, without necessarily converting opponents or undecided voters. Confusing these dimensions means turning circulation metrics into proof of political causation that would require specific investigation.
The problem begins to take on another character when the strategist is transformed into a providential figure. Saviors of the nation, electoral heroes, and miracle-working saints are recurring identities in the personalization of politics. They offer simple explanations for complex events, condensing collective processes into the trajectory of extraordinary individuals. This narrative operation can help explain the social demand for leaders and immediate solutions, but it does not justify replacing public policies with personal achievements, however remarkable they may be.
Communication Organized for War
The military language incorporated into digital political competition did not originate with Janones, nor does it belong exclusively to the progressive camp. Bolsonaro supporters had already normalized a lexicon of combat, troops, offensives, and information battles. The Lula Army emerged in an environment where organizing supporters through digital platforms had become an established instrument of electoral competition.
Recognizing this continuity does not mean equating the practices of different groups. Allegations of mass messaging associated with the 2018 Bolsonaro campaign and the voluntary organization of followers in a WhatsApp channel are distinct phenomena, with their own legal and political implications. The relevant comparison lies in the growing incorporation of command structures, military vocabularies, and coordinated operations into electoral communication.
The metaphor of war reveals a transformation in how political participation is conceived. Citizens are called on to take positions, carry out missions, amplify messages, and respond quickly to opponents’ moves. Communication becomes organized around operational objectives defined by coordination centers, while discussion of the participants’ own role in formulating strategies remains secondary.
This model is not necessarily incompatible with democracy. Electoral campaigns need organization, planning, and coordination. The problem arises with the possibility of turning an operational solution, developed for exceptional circumstances, into a permanent paradigm for political communication, without discussing its mechanisms for participation, transparency, and distribution of power.
The issue becomes particularly relevant given the prospect of maintaining the Lula Army after the election. The continuation of a mobilization network can expand channels of dialogue between representatives and citizens, but it also requires examining who sets priorities, who formulates messages, how disagreements are handled, and what opportunities exist for its members to participate autonomously.
Banking-Style Communication and Its Limits
Paulo Freire’s critique of banking education offers a conceptual reference for understanding this tension. In Pedagogy of the Oppressed, the educator questions the pedagogical relationship in which knowledge is deposited by an authority into subjects reduced to the status of recipients. His alternative presupposes dialogue, the shared construction of knowledge, and recognition of participants’ autonomy.
The analogy does not seek to turn an electoral campaign channel into an educational institution, but it does make it possible to examine the difference between distributing content and democratizing its production.
A structure in which coordinators develop messages, assign tasks, and direct their reproduction can achieve great communication efficiency. Its participants cease to be passive recipients when they share content and organize actions, but this activity does not automatically mean they participate in the decisions that determine the content and purpose of the messages.
There is a substantive difference between joining a distribution network and participating in a deliberative community. The former expands the ability to circulate information; the latter presupposes effective opportunities to influence the production of narratives, the setting of priorities, and the organization of the communication space itself.
The experience of Janones’s Army can be examined in light of this distinction, without assuming that all its activities followed the same pattern or that there were no autonomous initiatives among its members. The decisive point is to identify the limits of a mobilization model oriented predominantly toward the effectiveness of distribution.
Democracy is not realized solely by the number of people able to reproduce messages. It also depends on the conditions under which those people can create meaning, challenge directives, and participate in shaping public debate.
The Absence That Remains
The economic concentration of the media, dependence on digital platforms, the opacity of algorithmic systems, and inequalities in access to the production and circulation of information are institutional problems that go beyond the actions of any electoral leader.
A policy to democratize communication would require addressing these issues through instruments compatible with freedom of expression, pluralism, and constitutional guarantees. This involves discussing diversity of ownership and voices, the sustainability of independent and regional journalism, public communication, platform transparency, data protection, and mechanisms for social participation in formulating sectoral policies.
This is not a matter of advocating government control over content or ideological uniformity in debate. Democratizing communication means expanding the material and institutional conditions that allow different social groups to produce, access, and distribute information without depending exclusively on concentrated centers of economic, technological, or political power.
In this context, digital combat organizations can be understood as responses to the existing conditions of competition for public attention. They seek to achieve results within an environment marked by the concentration of communication infrastructure, but their ability to operate in that environment is not equivalent to transforming the structures that sustain it.
This is the contradiction that the celebration of electoral heroes tends to obscure. The skill to use private platforms does not eliminate dependence on them. The ability to gather millions of followers does not, by itself, redistribute control over algorithms, data, and recommendation systems. Nor does victory in a communication contest ensure the building of institutions capable of permanently expanding pluralism and participation.
Electoral communication seeks to win support. The democratization of communication seeks to distribute power. The two dimensions can complement each other, but they are not interchangeable.
Collective Agency and the Limits of Commanders
Street mobilization introduces a dimension often reduced in narratives centered on digital strategists. Public demonstrations are social processes involving local organization, community ties, networks of solidarity, accumulated political experience, and initiatives not always subordinate to formal campaign commands. Platforms can call for, amplify, and bring visibility to these demonstrations, just as in-person events can produce developments that fuel digital mobilization. This interaction needs to be investigated rather than prematurely turned into a chain of command with an individual author.
Janones’s contribution to this process can be acknowledged without assigning him the status of sole person responsible for collective mobilization. The same care applies to any political leader whose media profile ends up obscuring the participation of organizations and citizens. By turning a Brazilian experience into a potentially exportable formula, The Economist’s narrative risks presenting a circumstantial electoral strategy as a broader answer to the challenges of contemporary democracy, shifting questions that depend on institutions, rights, and public policies onto the performance of a single character.
The persistence of the language of war, regardless of who is in command, calls for examining the conditions that make this form of organization attractive and functional. A society can develop sophisticated structures for electoral mobilization and continue to face profound inequalities in access to the production and circulation of information. The success of a campaign can teach us a great deal about organization, language, and political participation, but it offers no automatic solution to the democratization of the media.
Saviors of the nation, heroes, and miracle-working saints help tell political stories. They do not replace institutions, rights, or public policies. The democratization of communication does not consist in choosing the commander capable of winning the next battle, but in building conditions that enable society to participate in defining the very terms of public debate.
Democracy does not need to do without leaders. Above all, it must not depend on miracles.
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References for Editorial Fact-Checking
- The Economist, November 5, 2026. “André ‘Mad Dog’ Janones is a hero of the Brazilian left”. Excerpt provided for analysis.
- UOL, Mateus Araújo, October 24, 2026. “WhatsApp becomes the PT’s weapon in the final stretch amid the right’s viralism on social media”.
- Exame, Soraia Alves, October 27, 2026, updated October 29. “What brands can learn from the digital mobilization of Janones and the ‘Lula Army’”.
- CNN Brasil, Danilo Moliterno, October 27, 2026, updated October 29. “Government plans to maintain ‘Lula Army’ as a force against Congress”.
- Paulo Freire. Pedagogy of the Oppressed. Conceptual reference.