DEBATE PREVIEW | What State Will Be at Stake This Sunday?
Lula and Flávio Bolsonaro arrive at their encounter on Band representing different projects for organizing power. Between the defense of the democratic rule of law, the return of Bolsonarism, economic inspiration from Javier Milei and the history of political alliances in Rio de Janeiro, the central question extends beyond electoral promises: what State does each candidacy intend to build, whom will it serve and who will be able to oversee it?
Editorial Board ·
This Sunday at 8 p.m., Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and Flávio Bolsonaro will face each other in the presidential debate hosted by Band. The usual expectations focus on the candidates' ability to embarrass their opponent, respond to accusations and secure the clips that will dominate social media in the hours that follow. Yet, with the election one week away, the encounter offers a far more important opportunity: to examine the nature of the competing projects for the State seeking the Presidency of the Republic and the political, economic and institutional consequences of their implementation.
A comparison confined to government platforms might suggest that we are facing two competing administrative proposals, distinguished only by the scale of public investment, the number of ministries or security strategies. This apparently balanced approach would be insufficient to grasp the scope of the contest, because the candidates represent different political experiences, carry different historical responsibilities and express conflicting conceptions of the relationship between power, democracy and society.
In this election, Lula represents the political camp that claims to defend the democratic rule of law, preserve constitutional guarantees and strengthen the State's capacity to promote development and social protection. Flávio Bolsonaro represents the return of the political project associated with Bolsonarism, whose experience in executive office demands scrutiny of authoritarian tendencies, relations between economic and political power, and its effective commitment to mechanisms of democratic oversight. This project now also incorporates an economic agenda whose coordinators express inspiration from the reforms implemented by Javier Milei in Argentina.
For Lawfare4All, the encounter must be analyzed in light of a structural question running through Brazilian politics: the struggle between strengthening democratic institutions and processes of State capture by economic, political and criminal interests. It is within this framework that we situate the hypothesis of authoritarian narco-statization, understood as the progressive permeability of State structures to the interests of organized crime, accompanied by the erosion of oversight mechanisms, the instrumentalization of violence and the convergence of political power, economic power and illicit networks. This process results in a transformation of the very nature of the State, whose authority progressively ceases to serve the public interest and instead protects the power structures that appropriate it.
The debate, therefore, should not be limited to asking which candidate promises to fight crime more forcefully, manage the budget better or expand particular services. We must understand which project has the conditions needed to preserve democratic sovereignty, safeguard rights and prevent criminal organizations from finding representation, influence and protection within the State itself.
The Argentine chainsaw, a fire sale and Brazilian public assets
The economic agenda presented by Flávio Bolsonaro deserves particular attention because its international inspiration is no longer merely an interpretation offered by opponents. Daniella Marques, former president of Caixa Econômica Federal and a central member of the candidacy's economic coordination team, publicly identified Javier Milei's government as a reference for measures she intends to implement in Brazil. Her team reported having mapped more than a thousand regulations for possible repeal, signaling that reducing the State's role will occupy a significant place in the platform.
The candidacy's proposed fiscal adjustment, estimated at approximately 1.5% of GDP, must be measured against its other commitments. Flávio promises to preserve social programs, pension benefits and the minimum wage while advocating spending cuts, tax revisions, smaller administrative structures and expanded privatization. This combination requires far more than declarations of confidence in private-sector efficiency: it requires showing which expenditures will be eliminated, which revenues will no longer enter the public coffers and which parts of society will bear the costs of the proposed reorganization.
The Argentine inspiration makes this demand even more important. Milei's experience involves political choices about the distribution of adjustment costs, the limits of State intervention and the reorganization of relations among capital, labor and social protection. Presenting the chainsaw as a symbol of administrative courage without explaining where it will be used amounts to seeking authorization for a far-reaching transformation without first submitting its consequences to citizens' knowledge.
The privatization program adds an asset dimension to this discussion. Daniella Marques has already presented the possibility of structuring financial instruments involving federally owned real estate, stakes in State-owned enterprises, public credits, receivables and oil contracts, mentioning a universe of assets exceeding R$5 trillion. This figure does not automatically correspond to the value of a sales program, but reveals the scale of the assets the economic team considers available for mobilization.
The recent history of Brazilian privatizations calls for treating with particular distrust any promise of fiscal adjustment based on the accelerated disposal of public assets. Under the justification of reducing the size of the State, strategic assets built over decades can be converted into extraordinary short-term revenue through transactions requiring independent valuations, corporate transparency and evidence of effective benefits for society.
The former BR Distribuidora provides a relevant example. During the Bolsonaro government, Petrobras completed the sale of its stake in the company, now Vibra Energia, relinquishing control of one of the country's largest fuel distribution networks. The process took place through public offerings distributed among numerous investors, and evaluating it requires examining not only the proceeds from the disposal, but also future revenues, the strategic capabilities transferred and the decision's economic effects.
The risk of a fire sale of public assets cannot be dismissed as a mere figure of speech when disposal programs are associated with the need to produce immediate fiscal results. Transferring public assets requires safeguards against depressed valuations, economic concentration and the use of opaque corporate structures, especially in an environment where recent investigations demonstrate criminal organizations' capacity to move billions of reais through formally constituted companies, funds, financial transactions and commercial networks.
It is precisely here that the economic agenda meets our reflection on authoritarian narco-statization. Reducing public structures and regulatory capacity, when not accompanied by robust oversight mechanisms, can expand opportunities for private capture and hamper the identification of the ultimate beneficiaries of major asset transactions. The problem is not simply determining how much money will enter the government's coffers, but understanding which economic and institutional instruments the country will lose, who may acquire them and how the origin of the funds used in those acquisitions will be verified.
Lula, however, must also account for the trajectory of public debt, his government's fiscal results and its capacity to finance the commitments announced for the next term. Defending public investment, social protection and industrial policy requires a consistent demonstration of funding sources, budget priorities and mechanisms designed to address tax privileges and low-impact spending.
The difference between the projects is not confined to the amount of resources available to the government. It involves defining which functions should remain under public responsibility, which each candidacy intends to subject to market logic and the mechanisms that will ensure their oversight. A country does not necessarily become richer by selling its assets; it may simply have more cash temporarily and permanently less economic capacity.
Labor: productivity for whom?
The discussion about reducing working hours and moving beyond the six-days-on, one-day-off schedule highlights another divergence between the candidacies. Lula includes expanding the time available for personal and family life in his agenda of valuing labor, while Flávio advocates more flexible forms of employment and measures to reduce labor costs, although his statements about the six-to-one schedule also require clarification about the position he actually intends to uphold.
The central question concerns not only job creation, but the distribution of the benefits generated by economic and technological development. Advances in automation, artificial intelligence and digital systems make it possible to reorganize productive processes and increase productivity, but do not automatically determine that these gains will be converted into better wages, shorter working hours or more dignified working conditions.
The Lula government must show how it intends to make its proposals viable across different economic activities, including the adaptation costs for small businesses and continuously operating sectors. Flávio, in turn, must explain how contractual flexibility will avoid transferring business risks to workers, especially in a labor market already marked by informality and unequal power between employers and employees.
The encounter should enable voters to identify the proposed development model and the place reserved for human labor in an economy increasingly reorganized by technology. After all, increasing productivity without discussing the distribution of its results may simply mean making the reproduction of existing inequalities more efficient.
Public security: who are the allies of those promising to fight organized crime?
Public security offers perhaps the most revealing ground for understanding the nature of the competing projects. While Lula advocates greater federal coordination, institutional integration and stronger intelligence and investigative mechanisms, Flávio Bolsonaro focuses some of his proposals on tougher criminal penalties and expanded repressive capacity. Yet the PL candidate arrives at the debate carrying an additional responsibility: explaining his history of honors, appointments and political alliances in Rio de Janeiro, a state marked by the expansion of militias and the progressive infiltration of criminal organizations into public institutions.
During his term in the Legislative Assembly, Flávio honored Adriano da Nóbrega, a former Bope captain subsequently identified by investigations as a leader of the Escritório do Crime. In 2005, he awarded him the Tiradentes Medal while Adriano was in pretrial detention, after having already introduced a motion of commendation in his favor. His office also employed Raimunda Veras Magalhães and Danielle Mendonça da Costa da Nóbrega, respectively the former police officer's mother and wife, whose appointments Fabrício Queiroz attributed to his own recommendation.
These relationships acquired another dimension through investigations into financial transactions in the former parliamentary office. According to the Rio de Janeiro Public Prosecutor's Office, Danielle allegedly transferred at least R$150,000 to Queiroz, some of it through accounts controlled by Adriano. Flávio has always denied wrongdoing, and the criminal investigation into the so-called salary-kickback scheme was closed following STJ and STF rulings that invalidated evidence used in the case. The procedural outcome, however, does not turn documented political and administrative choices into events irrelevant to someone seeking the Presidency of the Republic.
The issue does not end with Adriano da Nóbrega. In 2026, Flávio supported Márcio Canella's prospective Senate candidacy in Rio de Janeiro, an arrangement that included the announcement of Rogéria Bolsonaro, the presidential candidate's mother, as a possible substitute senator. Following judicial developments affecting Canella, the alliance became part of a broader discussion about the criteria for forming candidacies and the commitments established among political leaders in the state.
Investigations involving Rodrigo Bacellar and other figures in Rio de Janeiro politics reinforce the relevance of this institutional issue, although each episode has its own background, relationships and procedural situation. This is not about automatically assigning Flávio criminal responsibility for third parties' acts, but demanding explanations for documented political choices and for the mechanisms used to evaluate those who receive support, prestige and access to power structures.
The succession of episodes demonstrates why the convergence of political representation, economic structures and organized crime cannot be treated as a peripheral matter. Flávio said he had been surprised by the arrests of allies and advocated holding accountable those who committed wrongdoing, a position that makes an accounting even more necessary of previously established relationships, the criteria guiding those choices and the measures taken upon the first signs that members of this political milieu were involved in criminal activities.
The power of Brazilian criminal organizations does not depend exclusively on armed control of territories. Their expansion involves financial networks, money laundering, control of formally legal economic activities, corruption, access to logistics and the capacity to establish relationships with public officials. In this context, tougher penalties or an expanded repressive apparatus do not, on their own, demonstrate a capacity to confront the mechanisms through which organized crime influences public decisions and finds protection within institutions.
Lula, in turn, must account for the results and limitations of his security policy, showing how he intends to overcome federal, operational and institutional obstacles to target faction financing and prevent the capture of public structures. Defending the democratic rule of law requires confronting crime to reach the mechanisms of corruption and political influence that enable its expansion, including when investigations affect interests close to the government itself.
It is in this context that the hypothesis of authoritarian narco-statization moves beyond electoral rhetoric and becomes a concrete subject of investigation. The contest involves not merely two policing strategies, but the State's capacity to prevent criminal organizations from participating in the definition of its priorities, influencing the composition of its structures and finding protection among those who should be fighting them.
Flávio Bolsonaro must explain not only what he intends to do against criminal organizations, but how he assesses his own history of honors, appointments and political alliances in light of the investigations that subsequently reached members of that political milieu.
Health and education: social rights or expenditures to manage?
The organization of health and education also reveals differences that cannot be reduced to administrative efficiency. Lula advocates expanding the capacity of the SUS, specialized care, stronger educational policies and the use of public investment to address structural inequalities. Flávio presents proposals for reorganizing services, greater use of digital instruments, closer relationships with private providers and a review of funding and management mechanisms.
Analyzing these platforms requires distinguishing an effective expansion of service capacity from a mere change in the administrative instruments used to provide it. Digitizing appointments does not automatically create consultation slots, just as contracting private services does not necessarily resolve regional inequalities in access. In education, changing pedagogical models or funding structures likewise does not ensure improved learning without material conditions, qualified professionals and continuity of public policies.
The president must account for the results achieved and explain how he intends to overcome remaining deficiencies. His opponent must demonstrate which changes he intends to make, how much they will cost and which guarantees will be offered to preserve universal access and service quality.
The decisive point is understanding whether health and education will be treated primarily as rights whose realization requires permanent public capacity, or as sectors to be reorganized according to predominantly fiscal and managerial criteria. This difference will be especially important given the economic inspiration declared by Flávio's team, whose application to the Brazilian context must also be examined for its potential effects on the funding of social policies.
Democracy: who oversees the overseers?
The institutional dimension may be the most important aspect of the entire contest, precisely because the conditions needed to implement, oversee or challenge all the other proposals depend on it.
Lula presents the defense of democracy and constitutional institutions as central components of his candidacy. This commitment must also extend to confronting administrative opacity, the independence of investigative and oversight bodies, and a willingness to subject his own government's decisions to public scrutiny, including in politically inconvenient situations.
Flávio Bolsonaro proposes changes in relations among the branches of government, including restrictions on individual decisions in the Federal Supreme Court, while claiming continuity with a political camp whose experience in executive office produced profound controversies over institutional legitimacy and recognition of election results. The candidacy must explain which concrete commitments it makes to democratic alternation, the independence of oversight mechanisms and the constitutional limits on exercising power.
There is also a dimension frequently absent from this debate: the influence of large economic and media conglomerates on the conditions under which the popular will itself is formed. Relations among business leaders, candidates and the structures responsible for circulating information must be subject to transparency standards consistent with their public relevance, especially in a society where digital platforms and algorithmic systems exert growing influence over what citizens can learn.
The recent meeting between Flávio Bolsonaro and members of Grupo Globo's leadership, a few hours before his interview on Jornal Nacional, places this discussion in particularly concrete terms once again. Regardless of the institutional explanations provided by the company, the proximity between the controllers of large media conglomerates and presidential candidates must be subject to public scrutiny, particularly because editorial independence cannot depend exclusively on declarations from those holding economic power over news outlets.
Democracy is not exhausted by the formal legitimacy of its electoral procedures. It requires material conditions enabling the population to understand the competing projects, oversee the exercise of power and challenge versions of reality presented by governments, companies and institutions. None of these powers should claim public trust as a substitute for the possibility of independent verification.
Two questions for two projects for the State
The presidential debate offers an opportunity to clarify issues extending beyond electoral promises. Lula and Flávio Bolsonaro represent different trajectories and projects, but both must answer for what they intend to do with the power they seek. In the name of the public interest and the search for truth, Lawfare4All proposes two questions.
For Flávio Bolsonaro
Senator, you intend to reduce the size of the State, dispose of public assets and expand its repressive capacity. Considering your history of honors, appointments and political alliances in Rio de Janeiro that were subsequently reached by investigations into criminal organizations, what concrete guarantees can you offer that this project will not result in a State smaller when it comes to protecting the population's rights and more permeable to the interests of those with the money, influence and power to capture it?
For Lula
President, your trajectory and international recognition are associated with defending Brazilian sovereignty, dialogue among nations and democratic institutions. What structural transformations do you intend to undertake so that this sovereignty is also fully exercised within the country, reducing our economic and technological dependencies, confronting the criminal capture of institutions and ensuring that development produces lasting results for the population?
The encounter Brazil needs to watch
Journalistic balance does not require treating different trajectories as equivalent or turning every disagreement into a contest of individual preferences. It requires examining projects according to consistent criteria, testing statements against practices, promises against resources and democratic commitments against the oversight mechanisms each candidacy is willing to accept.
Preserving the democratic rule of law is not exhausted by maintaining periodic elections, just as confronting organized crime cannot be measured exclusively by tougher penalties or greater police force. The real challenge involves the capacity to prevent public structures from being captured by private interests, whether political, economic or criminal, while preserving the instruments society needs to oversee those exercising power in its name.
Brazil's 2026 presidential election confronts Brazilians with choices extending beyond the next budget cycle. At stake are the conditions for exercising popular sovereignty, the distribution of development's results, the protection of social rights, the preservation of collective assets and the limits imposed on those seeking to administer the State.
Debate coverage will have fulfilled its public function if it succeeds in revealing these differences rather than reducing them to a competition of sound bites, personal embarrassments and television performances. Voters need to know not only what each candidacy promises to accomplish, but also the power structure needed to fulfill its promises and the consequences of their implementation.
We do not want to know only who will win the debate. We want to know what State will survive the election.